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In order to control behavior in an adaptive manner the brain has to learn how some
situations and actions predict positive or negative outcomes. During the last decade
cognitive neuroscientists have shown that the brain is able to evaluate and learn from
outcomes within a few hundred milliseconds of their occurrence. This research has been
primarily focused on the feedback-related negativity (FRN) and the P3, two event-related
potential (ERP) components that are elicited by outcomes. The FRN is a frontally
distributed negative-polarity ERP component that typically reaches its maximal amplitude
250ms after outcome presentation and tends to be larger for negative than for positive
outcomes. The FRN has been associated with activity in the anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC). The P3 (∼300–600ms) is a parietally distributed positive-polarity ERP component
that tends to be larger for large magnitude than for small magnitude outcomes. The neural
sources of the P3 are probably distributed over different regions of the cortex. This paper
examines the theories that have been proposed to explain the functional role of these
two ERP components during outcome processing. Special attention is paid to extant
literature addressing how these ERP components are modulated by outcome valence
(negative vs. positive), outcome magnitude (large vs. small), outcome probability (unlikely
vs. likely), and behavioral adjustment. The literature offers few generalizable conclusions,
but is beset with a number of inconsistencies across studies. This paper discusses the
potential reasons for these inconsistencies and points out some challenges that probably
will shape the field over the next decade.
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INTRODUCTION
The global function of the nervous system can be character-
ized as the adaptive control of behavior, a process that involves
learning which action is relevant in a given context and switch-
ing to a different behavioral policy or scenario when outcomes
are less optimal than expected. Hence “outcome” refers to the
consequences that an organism faces as direct result of its own
actions (e.g., financial losses due to impulsive investments) or
resulting from its situation (e.g., receiving an unexpected gift).
In order to successfully adapt behavior the brain has to deter-
mine, as quickly and as accurately as possible, whether the current
scenario and behavioral policy results in positive or negative
outcomes. This paper reviews the extant literature on how two
event-related potential (ERP) components, the feedback-related
negativity (FRN), and the P3, shed light on the neural substrate
of outcome processing.
The relevance of outcome processing is highlighted by the
association between individual differences in its functioning and
personality constructs (Kramer et al., 2008; Onoda et al., 2010;
Smillie et al., 2011), economic preferences (Coricelli et al., 2005;
Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; De Martino et al., 2006; Kable and
Glimcher, 2007; Venkatraman et al., 2009), and pathological
conditions such as compulsive gambling (Reuter et al., 2005;
Goudriaan et al., 2006), drug abuse (Shiv et al., 2005; Everitt et al.,
2007; Fein and Chang, 2008; Franken et al., 2010; Fridberg et al.,
2010; Park et al., 2010), depression (Foti and Hajcak, 2009), and
schizophrenia (Gold et al., 2008; Morris et al., 2008).
In the past decade neuroimaging studies have contributed
enormously to identifying brain regions and patterns of func-
tional connectivity supporting outcome processing in the human
brain (e.g., Delgado et al., 2000, 2003; Breiter et al., 2001;
Elliott et al., 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2003b; Ullsperger and
Von Cramon, 2003; Holroyd et al., 2004b; Huettel et al., 2006;
Kim et al., 2006; Mullette-Gillman et al., 2011). The discov-
ery of this underlying physiology has been accompanied by a
wealth of new knowledge about the functional properties of
these mechanisms. In particular, non-invasive electrophysiolog-
ical methods have provided important information about the
temporal properties of the neural mechanisms mediating out-
come evaluation in humans. Notably, by recording ERPs while
participants perform learning-guided choice tasks or simple gam-
bling games, researchers have begun to describe how the brain
processes outcomes within a few hundred milliseconds from their
onset.
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Among the potential neural correlates of outcome evaluation,
the FRN is by far the most studied ERP component. The FRN is a
frontocentral negative-going ERP component that peaks∼250ms
following outcome presentation and is typically larger for nega-
tive outcomes than for positive outcomes (Figure 1A). According
to source localization, the FRN is generated in the medial pre-
frontal cortex (mPFC), most probably in the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC; Miltner et al., 1997; Gehring andWilloughby, 2002;
Ruchsow et al., 2002; van Schie et al., 2004; Muller et al., 2005;
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005b; Hewig et al., 2007; Yu and Zhou, 2009;
Yu et al., 2011). Consistent with ERP studies, results implicating
the ACC in processing negative feedback have been reported using
fMRI (Kiehl et al., 2000; Holroyd et al., 2004b).
The P3 is another outcome-related ERP component. The P3
is a positive-polarity component most pronounced at the cen-
troparietal recording sites at about 300–600ms after stimuli pre-
sentation (Figure 1B). According to a model proposed by Yeung
and Sanfey (2004) outcome magnitude (i.e., large vs. small) and
outcome valence (i.e., loss vs. gains) are coded separately in the
brain, with the P3 being sensitive to outcome magnitude and the
FRN to outcome valence. Despite controversial evidence (Hajcak
et al., 2005, 2007; Bellebaum and Daum, 2008; Goyer et al., 2008;
Wu and Zhou, 2009; Pfabigan et al., 2011) the independent cod-
ing model is presently the dominant account of the relationship
between the FRN and the P3 during outcome processing.
The number of ERP studies of outcome have multiplied over
the last decade. Yet the last systematic review of such stud-
ies focused exclusively on the FRN, and dates back 8 years
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004a). This paper intends to provide an
updated perspective about current knowledge from ERP research
of outcome processing in the human brain. In order to achieve
this goal, the paper reviews the historical antecedents and dom-
inant theoretical accounts of the FRN and P3. These theories
are evaluated in light of studies addressing how FRN and P3 are
modulated by outcome valence (negative vs. positive), outcome
magnitude (large vs. small), outcome probability (unlikely vs.
likely), and behavioral adjustment. Finally, this paper discusses
some challenges that ERP studies of outcome processing will
probably have to address over the next decade in order to integrate
FRN and P3 effects in a unitary account of outcome processing in
the brain.
THE FEEDBACK-RELATED NEGATIVITY
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE FRN
The study of the neural basis of outcome evaluation and feedback-
guided learning has been facilitated by the discovery of an ERP
component, the FRN, which tends to distinguish between positive
and negative outcomes. Miltner et al. (1997) was the first group
to describe the FRN as an ERP component that is differentially
sensitive to negative and positive feedback. In their study, they
required participants to estimate the duration of a 1 s interval by
pressing a button when they believed that 1 s had elapsed from the
presentation of a cue. Their response was followed by the delivery
of a feedback stimulus indicating whether their estimate was cor-
rect (positive feedback) or incorrect (negative feedback). A time
window around 1 s was used to determine response accuracy and
this window was adjusted so that the likelihood of positive and
negative feedback stimuli for each participant were both 50%.
Miltner and colleagues found that the ERP elicited by negative
feedback was characterized by a negative deflection at fronto-
central recording sites with a peak latency of ∼250ms. This
negativity was isolated with the method of difference waves, that
is by subtracting the ERP response to positive feedback from
the ERP response to negative feedback. Source localization esti-
mates placed the generator of this difference wave near the ACC.
The same results were found across different conditions in which
FIGURE 1 | A schematic representation of ERP waveforms typically
elicited by outcomes (based on Gehring and Willoughby, 2002;
Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Goyer et al., 2008; Gu et al., 2011a).
The horizontal axis represents the elapsed time relative to the onset
of behavioral feedback (at 0ms). (A) Example of ERP waveform for
negative and positive outcomes recorded at a frontocentral electrode
site. The scalp topography represents the contrast between the two
waveforms at the time when the FRN peaks (∼250ms). (B) Example
of ERP waveform for large and small magnitude outcomes recorded at
a central-parietal electrode site. The scalp topography represents the
contrast between the two waveforms at the time when the P3b peaks
(∼300–600 ms).
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feedback was provided in auditory, visual, and somatosensory
modalities. Miltner and colleagues noted that the characteristics
of this negativity corresponded in many respects (i.e., sensitivity
to errors, polarity, scalp topography, and likely origin in the ACC)
to those of the response-locked error-related negativity (ERN),
an ERP component that reaches maximum amplitude about
100ms following error commission in speeded response time
tasks (Falkenstein et al., 1991; Gehring et al., 1993; Scheffers et al.,
1996; for a review see Yeung et al., 2004). The authors suggested
that both the ERN (elicited by error commission) and the FRN
(elicited by negative feedback) reflect a general error detection
function of the ACC. Indeed, converging lines of evidence from
fMRI research (Kiehl et al., 2000; Holroyd et al., 2004b), magneto-
encephalography (Miltner et al., 2003; Donamayor et al., 2011)
and intracranial EEG recordings in humans (Wang et al., 2005)
support the idea that the ACC is involved in performance moni-
toring and error detection.
THE REINFORCEMENT LEARNING THEORY OF THE FRN
The error detection hypothesis (Miltner et al., 1997) was later
extended by Holroyd and Coles (2002), who proposed that both
the ERN and the FRN are scalp-recorded indexes of a neural sys-
tem for reinforcement learning. This theory is based on research
that implicates the basal ganglia and the midbrain dopamine
(DA) system in reward prediction and reinforcement learning
(Barto, 1995; Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz
and Dickinson, 2000; Tobler et al., 2005; for a review see Schultz,
2002). From a computational standpoint, reinforcement learning
problems involve a set of world states, a set of actions available
to the agent in each state, a transition function which specifies
the probability of moving from one state to another when per-
forming a specific action, and a reward function, which indicates
the reward or punishment associated with each transition (Ribas-
Fernandes et al., 2011). In this context, the goal for learning is to
discover, on a trial and error fashion, a policy (i.e., a stable map-
ping between states and actions) that maximizes the cumulative
discounted long-term reward (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
According to the reinforcement learning theory of the
ERN/FRN (RL-theory) the human brain solves reinforcement
learning problems by implementing an “actor-critic architecture”
(Barto, 1995; Joel et al., 2002). This theory assumes that several
actors are implemented throughout the brain (e.g., amygdala,
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), each acting semi-independently
and in parallel, and each trying to exert their influence over
the motor system. According to the RL-theory, the ACC acts as
a control filter, selecting a motor plan according to weighted
state-action associations and communicating the corresponding
response to the output layer (i.e., motor cortex) for execution.
The role of the critic in the actor-critic architecture is to eval-
uate ongoing events and predict whether future events will be
favorable or unfavorable. When the critic revises its predictions
for the better or for worse, it computes a temporal-difference
reward prediction error (RPE). A positive or a negative RPE
indicates that ongoing events are better than expected or worse
than expected, respectively. The RPE is used to update both
the value attached to the previous state and the strength of
the state-action associations that determined the last response
selection. The RL-theory attributes the role of the critic to the
basal ganglia and assumes that the RPE signal corresponds to
the phasic increase (for positive RPE, or +RPE) or decrease
(for negative RPE, or −RPE) in the activity of midbrain DA
neurons. Indeed, dopaminergic neurons in the monkey mid-
brain have been shown to code positive and negative errors in
reward prediction (Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz and Dickinson,
2000; Tobler et al., 2005). According to the RL-theory, the RPE
signal (i.e., phasic DA) is distributed to three parts of the net-
work: (1) the adaptive critic itself (i.e., basal ganglia), where it
is used to refine the ongoing predictions, (2) the motor con-
trollers (e.g., amygdala), where it is used to adjust the state-action
mappings, and (3) the control filter (i.e., ACC), where it is used
to train the filter to select the most adaptive motor controller
on a given situation. Together, the adaptive critic, the motor
controllers, and the control filter learn how best to perform in
reinforcement learning scenarios. The RL-theory proposes that
the impact of DA signals on the ACC modulates the amplitude
of the ERN/FRN (Holroyd and Coles, 2002). According to this
theory, phasic decreases in DA activity enlarge ERN/FRN by indi-
rectly disinhibiting the apical dendrites of motor neurons in the
ACC, and phasic increases in DA activity reduce the ERN/FRN
by indirectly inhibiting the apical dendrites of motor neurons in
the ACC.
Despite a group of inconsistent findings that are reviewed
in the next section (Hajcak et al., 2005; Oliveira et al., 2007;
San Martin et al., 2010; Kreussel et al., 2012), the RL-theory
remains as the dominant account of the FRN. Also, it has been
an important factor contributing to the augment in the num-
ber of studies about this ERP component, mainly because of
three reasons. First, the RL-theory speaks to one of the most
explored issues in cognitive neuroscience, namely the cogni-
tive functions implemented by the mPFC, and more specifically
the ACC (Carter et al., 1998; Bush et al., 2000; Paus, 2001;
Botvinick et al., 2004; Kerns et al., 2004; Ridderinkhof et al.,
2004; Rushworth et al., 2004; Barber and Carter, 2005; Alexander
and Brown, 2011). The RL-theory suggests that the general role
of the ACC is the adaptive control of behavior, and that the
ACC learns how to better perform its function from discrep-
ancies between actual and optimal responses (for the ERN) or
between actual and expected outcomes (for the FRN). This notion
challenges the conflict-monitoring model (Botvinick et al., 2001;
Botvinick, 2007) that characterizes the ACC as a region that
can detect conflict between more than one response tendency,
for example when a stimulus primes a pre-potent but incorrect
response, or when the correct response is undetermined. While
the conflict-monitoring model is consistent with neuroimaging
evidence for ACC activation during error commission (Carter
et al., 1998; Kerns et al., 2004) and with the characteristics of
the ERN (Yeung et al., 2004), it does not address the FRN and
is inconsistent with evidence from monkey neurophysiological
studies that have not found any conflict-related activity in the
ACC (Ito et al., 2003; Nakamura et al., 2005). The RL-theory, on
the other hand, provides an explanation for both the ERN and
the FRN, and accounts for ACC responses to outcomes in fMRI
studies (Bush et al., 2002; Paulus et al., 2004), and in single-unit
recording studies withmonkeys (Niki andWatanabe, 1979; Amiez
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et al., 2005; Tsujimoto et al., 2006) and humans (Williams et al.,
2004).
Second, the RL-theory proposes that the FRN reflects the eval-
uation of events along a general good–bad dimension, but it is
non-specific about what actually constitutes a good or a bad out-
come. Thus, the theory applies both to the difference between
financial rewards and punishments (i.e., utilitarian feedback)
and to the difference between correct trials and error trials (i.e.,
performance feedback). This factor makes the FRN especially
relevant both for researchers interested in economic decision-
making, and for researchers interested in the neural mechanisms
of cognitive control. Gehring and Willoughby (2002) questioned
the existence of such a highly generic mechanism by showing a
medial frontal negativity (MFN) that was elicited by negative util-
itarian feedback (loss of money vs. gain of money) but not by
stimuli revealing that an alternative choice would have yielded
a better result than the actual choice (i.e., performance feed-
back). However, in a subsequent study Nieuwenhuis et al. (2004b)
showed that when feedback stimuli conveyed both utilitarian and
performance information the FRN reflects either dimension of
the information, depending on which aspect of the feedback is
highlighted by the physical properties of the stimuli.
Finally, another contribution of RL-theory to the growing
interest in the FRN is that this theory affirms that the events
are treated as good or bad outcomes not in absolute terms but
relative to their relationship with expectations. Since the FRN
would reflect the difference between the actual and the expected
outcomes, the FRN would potentially provide both a measure
of the impact of events (i.e., experienced value) and a mea-
sure of anteceding expectations (i.e., expected value). Most of
the research about outcome processing in the brain has explored
these factors; several research groups have studied the modu-
lation of the FRN by both properties of the outcome, such as
valence (loss vs. win) andmagnitude (large vs. small), or by prop-
erties of the context in which the outcome is presented, such
as reward probability and the potential magnitude of reward.
Few studies have also explored another critical component of
the RL-theory, which implies that the amplitude of the FRN
in a particular trial should predict the degree of behavioral
adjustment in subsequent trials (Holroyd and Coles, 2002). The
following section discusses the RL-theory in light of studies
investigating the relationship between the FRN and outcome
valence, outcome magnitude, outcome probability, and behav-
ioral adjustment.
MODULATION OF THE FRN BY OUTCOMES AND CONTEXTS
The RL-theory predicts that the amplitude of the FRN is cor-
related with the magnitude of the RPE. If this is true, negative
outcomes should elicit larger FRNs than positive outcomes; larger
negative outcomes should elicit larger FRNs than smaller negative
outcomes; and unexpected negative outcomes should elicit larger
FRNs than expected negative outcomes. The RL-theory also pre-
dicts an interaction between valence and magnitude and between
valence and probability. For example, small gains should be asso-
ciated with greater FRNs than large gains. Finally, according to
the RL-theory the amplitude of the FRN on a given trial should
predict behavioral adjustment on subsequent trials. This section
examines the RL-theory in the context of studies addressing how
the FRN is modulated by outcome valence (negative vs. posi-
tive), outcome magnitude (large vs. small), outcome probability
(unlikely vs. likely), and behavioral adjustment.
Outcome valence
The most consistent finding in the FRN literature is that such
ERP component is larger for negative feedback than for posi-
tive feedback. This valence dependency has been confirmed using
monetary rewards (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd and
Coles, 2002; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Goyer et al., 2008; Yu et al.,
2011) and non-monetary performance feedback (Miltner et al.,
1997; Luu et al., 2003; Frank et al., 2005; Luque et al., 2012). These
studies have typically measured the FRN amplitude by computing
the difference between the ERP elicited after negative outcomes
and the ERP elicited after positive outcomes. This approach is
most common because the overlap between the FRN and the
P3 may distort the FRN net amplitude. However, a disadvan-
tage to this method is that it does not inform whether the FRN
corresponds to a negative deflection after negative outcomes or
to a positive deflection after positive outcomes, or both. Indeed,
a recent hypothesis argues that the differences between positive
and negative outcomes could be better explained by a positivity
associated with better than expected outcomes, rather than a neg-
ativity associated with worse than expected ones (Holroyd et al.,
2008). This theory proposes that unexpected outcomes, regard-
less of their valence, elicit a negative deflection known as the N200
(Towey et al., 1980) and that trials with unexpected rewards elicit
a feedback correct-related positivity (fCRP) that cancels the effect
of the N200 component in the scalp-recorded ERP.
Recently, several groups have begun to quantify the FRN inde-
pendently for positive and negative outcomes, and most of these
studies have found greater modulation of the FRN to positive out-
comes than to negative outcomes (Cohen et al., 2007; Eppinger
et al., 2008, 2009; SanMartin et al., 2010; Foti et al., 2011; Kreussel
et al., 2012). However, at the same time these effects tend to dis-
confirm the fCRP-hypothesis, by showing a greater positivity for
expected compared with unexpected gains (Oliveira et al., 2007;
Wu and Zhou, 2009; SanMartin et al., 2010; Chase et al., 2011; Yu
et al., 2011; Kreussel et al., 2012).
In summary, the FRN is consistently larger for negative as
compared to positive feedback, but it is not clear if this effect is
due to a negative deflection following negative outcomes, a pos-
itive deflection following positive outcomes, both alternatives, or
some unmentioned factor. This issue is critical for future research
regarding the neurocognitive role of the FRN, and as of yet
remains an open question.
Outcome magnitude
According to the RL-theory the FRN should not reflect a main
effect of outcome magnitude given that the magnitude of an
outcome can be evaluated as positive or negative only after con-
sidering the valence of such outcome (i.e., large gains are better
than small gains, but the opposite is true for losses). Confirming
this observation, several studies have noted the absence of a main
effect of outcomemagnitude (Mars et al., 2004; Yeung and Sanfey,
2004; Toyomaki and Murohashi, 2005; Polezzi et al., 2010). In
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a now-classic study, Yeung and Sanfey (2004) asked participants
to select between cards that were unpredictably associated with
monetary gains and losses of variable magnitude. The authors
conclude in this study that the FRNwas larger for losses compared
with gains and did not show a main effect of outcome magni-
tude. However, others have reported that the FRN is larger for
small magnitude outcomes, regardless of valence (Wu and Zhou,
2009; Gu et al., 2011a; Kreussel et al., 2012). This second set of
studies did not elaborate on this finding, but rather as Wu and
Zhou (2009) have suggested, the discrepancy could be related
either to different approaches to measuring the FRN, or to the use
of experimental paradigms where the expectancy toward reward
magnitude was emphasized.
If the FRN does indeed code the difference between expected
outcomes and obtained outcomes, it should be sensitive to devi-
ations from expected reward magnitude (e.g., if the person
expected a large loss, a small loss should be treated as a pos-
itive outcome). Aligned with this notion, Goyer et al. (2008)
found that a model that includes both valence and magnitude
explained a larger proportion of the variance associated with the
FRN compared with a model that only includes valence. They
also found that the difference between the FRN elicited by mon-
etary losses and the FRN elicited by monetary gains was greater
for large magnitude outcomes (i.e., −25¢ minus +25¢) than for
small magnitude outcomes (i.e. −5¢ minus +5¢). In a related
study, Holroyd et al. (2004a) found that the amplitude of the FRN
depends on the range of possible outcomes in a given block. For
instance, winning +2.5¢ elicited a smaller FRN when it was the
best possible outcome than the same result when winning +5¢
was also possible. This FRN effect provided strong support to the
RL-theory, according to which the FRN is an indirect measure
of a firing pattern of DA neurons in the midbrain. Indeed, it has
been shown that the same reinforcement can lead to phasic DA
decreases if it is smaller than expected or phasic DA increases if it
is larger than expected (Tobler et al., 2005).
Other studies have found effects that are less consistent with
the RL-theory. Hajcak et al. (2006) reported that the FRN ampli-
tude did not scale with the magnitude of the loss; Bellebaum et al.
(2010) reported that the size of the potential reward affected the
FRN amplitude in response to non-reward, but not to positive
feedback; and San Martin et al. (2010) reported that the size of
the potential reward affected the FRN amplitude in response to
monetary gains, but not to monetary losses. These studies suggest
that under some circumstances the FRN does not mirror a graded
RPE. In this sense therefore, the existing literature is not entirely
consistent with the RL-theory and new research is necessary to
help resolve these disparate results.
Outcome probability
The probability of the experienced outcome is yet another fac-
tor that is crucial to the RPE and the RL-theory predicts that
the probability of reward would affect the FRN responses to the
upcoming outcome. Unexpected losses therefore should be asso-
ciated with greater negativities than expected losses, and unex-
pected gains should elicit greater positivities than expected gains.
Several studies have supported this prediction (Holroyd and
Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002; Holroyd et al., 2003, 2009,
2011; Potts et al., 2006; Hajcak et al., 2007; Goyer et al., 2008;
Walsh and Anderson, 2011; Luque et al., 2012). Nevertheless,
with the exception of the study by Potts et al. (2006), these
studies employed a difference wave approach (i.e., loss minus
gain) and therefore it is not clear if the effects were driven
by large negativities associated with unexpected negative out-
comes or large positivities associated with unexpected positive
outcomes, or some combination of both. Moreover, the dif-
ference wave approach might find an effect in the direction
predicted by the RL-theory even if unexpected outcomes, regard-
less of valence, are associated with larger negativities, provided
that the effect is greater for losses. A study by Oliveira et al.
(2007) shed further light onto this issue. They found that pos-
itive feedback and negative feedback elicited a similarly large
FRN when the actual feedback and the expected feedback mis-
matched. They reported a tendency for people to be overly
optimistic about their own performance, and they found that
because of this tendency there were three times more mismatches
between expectancy and the actual feedback for erroneous tri-
als than for correct trials. Similarly, other studies have reported
that the FRN is elicited by unexpected outcomes, regardless
of valence (Wu and Zhou, 2009; Chase et al., 2011; Yu et al.,
2011).
Oliveira et al. (2007) proposed that the FRN reflects the
response of the ACC to violations of expectancy in general (i.e.,
unsigned RPE), and not only for unexpected negative outcomes.
Similar conclusions have been reached using fMRI in humans
(Walton et al., 2004; Aarts et al., 2008; Metereau and Dreher,
2012) and single-unit recordings inmonkeys (Niki andWatanabe,
1979; Akkal et al., 2002; Ito et al., 2003; Matsumoto andHikosaka,
2009; Hayden et al., 2011). Also, a recent computational model
(Alexander and Brown, 2011) has been able to simulate the FRN
under the assumption that the mPFC is activated by surpris-
ing events, regardless of valence. However, some studies have
reported effects that are hard to reconcile with Oliveira et al.’s
account of the FRN. Both Potts et al. (2006) and Cohen et al.
(2007) found that unexpected gains elicited larger positivities
than expected gains, not larger negativities as Oliveira and col-
leagues suggest. In another study, Hajcak et al. (2005) reported
that the FRN was equally large for expected and unexpected nega-
tive feedback; a result that is inconsistent with both Oliveira et al.’s
account and with the RL-theory.
Broadly speaking, the evidence reviewed above does not per-
mit conclusions about the modulation of the FRN by outcome
probability. Both the RL-theory and the hypothesis proposed
by Oliveira et al. (2007) have received empirical support, but
these are mutually exclusive accounts. New research is needed in
order to understand the relationship between FRN amplitude and
outcome probability.
Behavioral adjustment
Convergent evidence has implicated the ACC in the flexible
adjustment of behavior on the basis of changes in reward and
punishment values. For example, a recent study showed that cin-
gulate lesions in monkeys impaired the ability to use previous
reinforcements to guide choice behavior (Kennerley et al., 2006).
Another study, using a reward-based reversal learning paradigm,
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identified cells in the ACC of the monkey brain that fired only if
reward was less than anticipated and if such reduction in reward
was followed by changes in action selection (Shima and Tanji,
1998). In humans, fMRI studies of reversal learning have reported
the same effect (Bush et al., 2002; O’Doherty et al., 2003a).
If neural RPE signals are used to guide decision-making and
the FRN reflects the impact of such signals in the ACC, as sug-
gested by the RL-theory, FRN magnitudes in response to decision
outcomes should be related to adjustments in overt behavior.
Evidence for this hypothesis was demonstrated by Luu et al.
(2003) using a task in which participants had to respond to a tar-
get arrow with the hand indicated by the direction in which the
arrow pointed. Luu and colleagues found that the amplitude of
the FRN elicited by a feedback indicating that the response was
slow correlated with subsequent speed of response. In another
study, Frank et al. (2005) showed that the difference between
the FRN elicited by negative and positive feedback correlated,
across participants, with the difference between subjects’ ability
to learn to avoid negative feedback versus to learn to approach
positive feedback. Similarly, Bellebaum and Daum (2008) found
that violations of reward predictions modulated the FRN only in
participants that were able to learn, through trial and error, and
use a rule determining reward probability. However, the last two
studies (Frank et al., 2005; Bellebaum and Daum, 2008) do not
rule out the possibility that the reported effects are by-products
of learning instead of underlying causes of individual differences
in overt behavior.
Other researchers have found results that conflict with the
RL-theory. For example, Mars et al. (2004) found that while
subjects used the information provided by error feedback to
adjust their behavior in a time judgment task, no relation-
ship between FRN amplitude and behavioral adjustments was
found. Specifically, more precise adjustments were evident fol-
lowing more versus less informative feedback, and larger behav-
ioral adjustments were seen when subjects received feedback
that implied a large error than following feedback suggesting
a small error. However, FRN amplitude was smaller in the
informative conditions, and was not influenced by the degree
of error. In another study, Walsh and Anderson (2011) pre-
sented a decision-making task with two conditions: a no instruc-
tion condition in which participants received feedback about
whether their choices were rewarded and had to learn reward
probabilities by trial and error, and an instruction condition,
where they additionally received a description of the associa-
tion between cues and reward probabilities before performing
the task. The authors found that instruction eliminated the asso-
ciation between feedback and behavioral adjustment, but the
FRN still changed with experience in the instruction condition.
These studies suggest that, at least under some circumstances, the
FRN can be elicited in the absence of behavioral adjustment, and
behavior can be adjusted in the absence of a concomitant FRN
effect.
Other studies do report a relationship between the FRN and
behavioral adjustment, but not in the direction that the RL-theory
predicts. For example, Yeung and Sanfey (2004) reported that
after a large loss of money participants tended to repeat the selec-
tion of the larger magnitude (i.e., risky option), particularly if
the preceding outcome elicited a large FRN. Similarly, using a
computer Blackjack gambling task, Hewig et al. (2007) found that
those participants exhibiting increased FRNs when losing after
making risky choices showed a strong tendency to switch to even
more risky choices. These results represent a challenge for the
RL-theory, which predicts that participants should be less likely
rather than more likely to perseverate in a response strategy after
a large FRN.
One of the strengths of the RL-theory is that it provides pre-
dictions at the trial-by-trial level. Computational models can be
fitted to behavioral data and the FRN can be compared with
values derived from such models, such as the trial-by-trial fluc-
tuation of the RPE during the task. Two studies found dissimilar
results using that approach. In one study, participants played a
competitive game called “matching pennies” against a simulated
opponent (Cohen and Ranganath, 2007). On each trial, the sub-
ject and the computer opponent each selected one of two targets.
If the subject and the computer opponent chose the same tar-
get, the subject lost one point, and if they chose opposite targets,
the subject won one point. Supporting the RL-theory, the authors
found that the FRN elicited by losses was more negative when
subjects chose the opposite versus the same target on the subse-
quent trial. In another study, Chase et al. (2011) reported that
the FRN amplitude was positively correlated with the magnitude
of the negative RPE (−RPE), but negative outcomes that pre-
ceded behavioral adjustments were not accompanied by enlarged
FRNs. The discrepancy between the results found by these studies
could be explained by the characteristics of their experimen-
tal paradigms. The task used by Cohen and Ranganath (2007)
discouraged the adoption of explicit rules or strategies. The sim-
ulated opponent was preprogrammed to choose randomly unless
it was possible to find and exploit patterns in the behavior of the
human participant. In contrast, in the study by Chase et al. (2011)
participants were instructed to switch choice behavior only when
they were sure that a rule determining the stimuli-response map-
ping had changed, and not after each exception to that rule.
Indeed, in the study by Chase and colleagues the first violations of
the rules were associated with greater −RPEs and greater FRNs,
but not with behavioral adjustment.
In summary, different studies suggest that, at least in some
learning situations, the processes underlying the generation of
the FRN might be dissociated from the processes responsible for
behavioral adjustments. It is possible, like the results from Chase
et al. (2011) andWalsh and Anderson (2011) suggest, that the RL-
theory does not account for behavioral adjustment under some
learning context, but still predicts trial-by-trial fluctuations in
FRN amplitude.
THE P3
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE P3
The P3 is a positive large-amplitude ERP component with a
broad, midline scalp distribution, and with peak latency between
300 and 600ms following presentation of stimuli. First reported
in 1965 (Desmedt et al., 1965; Sutton et al., 1965), the P3 is
perhaps the single most studied component of the ERP, proba-
bly because it is elicited in many cognitive tasks involving any
sensory modality. The antecedent conditions of the P3 have
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been extensively explored using the so-called “oddball” paradigm
(Duncan-Johnson and Donchin, 1977; Pritchard, 1981; Murphy
and Segalowitz, 2004; Campanella et al., 2012), in which low-
frequency target stimuli (oddballs) are embedded in a train of
non-target stimuli (standards). Typically the subject is required to
actively respond to each target stimulus. Using this task, Duncan-
Johnson and Donchin (1977) were the first to report a correlation
between the probability of an eliciting stimulus and the P3 ampli-
tude. Specifically, they found that P3 amplitude was inversely
proportional to the frequency or probability of the target stimuli
in an oddball sequence (for an extensive review, see Nieuwenhuis
et al., 2005a).
THE CONTEXT UPDATING HYPOTHESIS AND THE NEURAL
SOURCES OF THE P3
The most influential account of the P3 is the context updat-
ing hypothesis (Donchin, 1981; Donchin and Coles, 1988). In
this framework, the P3 indexes brain activity underlying the
stimuli-induced revision of a mental model of the task at hand.
If subsequent stimuli deliver information that mismatches with
part of such model, the model is updated, with the amplitude of
the P3 being proportional to the amount of cognitive resources
employed during the revision the model.
There is an important degree of uncertainty regarding the
neural generators of the P3. Lutzenberger et al. (1987) argued
that large-amplitude potentials like the P3 must have widespread
sources. Consistent with this view, intracranial P3-like activity
has been recorded from multiple cortical areas (for a review see
Soltani and Knight, 2000). Probably the most likely neural sources
of the P3b can be found in a region that includes the temporal-
parietal junction (TPJ; consisting of the supramarginal gyrus and
caudal parts of the superior temporal gyrus) and adjacent areas
(Kiss et al., 1989; Smith et al., 1990; Halgren et al., 1995). Indeed,
studies have shown that lesions of the TPJ region producemarked
reductions of the P3 associated with infrequent, task-relevant
stimuli (Yamaguchi and Knight, 1992; Verleger et al., 1994; Knight
and Scabini, 1998).
P3-like potentials have also been observed in medial temporal
lobe (MTL) structures, including hippocampus and amygdala in
cats (Kaga et al., 1992), monkeys (Paller et al., 1992), and humans
(Halgren et al., 1980; McCarthy et al., 1989; Smith et al., 1990).
The thalamus is another deep structure that produces P3-like
potentials in humans (Yingling and Hosobuchi, 1984). However,
biophysical considerations indicate that the possible contribu-
tions of deep cortical structures like the MTL and thalamus to the
scalp-recorded electroencephalogram (EEG) are much too small
(Lutzenberger et al., 1987; Birbaumer et al., 1990) and thus, the
available evidence suggests that TPJ and adjacent areas are the
most likely neural sources of the scalp-recorded P3.
THE LOCUS COERULEUS–P3 HYPOTHESIS
A more recent hypothesis proposes that the P3 reflects the neu-
romodulatory effect of the locus coeruleus (LC) norepinephrine
(NE) system in the neocortex (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005a). This
hypothesis was the first account of the P3 based on neuroscien-
tific knowledge and it is supported both by similarities between
the target areas of NE projections and likely P3 generators,
and by similarities between the antecedent conditions for phasic
increases in NE and the antecedent conditions for P3 generation.
The main claim of the “LC-P3 hypothesis” is that the P3 reflects a
LC-mediated enhancement of neural responsivity in the cortex to
task-relevant stimuli. Indeed, it has been shown that NE increases
the responsivity of target neurons, and that such enhanced gain
produces an increase in the signal-to noise ratio of subsequent
processing (Servan-Schreiber et al., 1990).
The main source of NE for the forebrain is provided by the LC
which is a small nucleus in the pontine region of the brain stem.
Within the neocortex, NE innervation is particularly high in the
prefrontal cortex and parietal cortex (Levitt et al., 1984; Morrison
and Foote, 1986; Foote and Morrison, 1987). Dense NE innerva-
tion for the thalamus, amygdala, and hippocampus has also been
reported (Morrison and Foote, 1986). Building on this overlap
between NE targets and likely P3 generations is one of the main
strengths of the LC-P3 hypothesis. Also, the latency of the LC
phasic response (150–200ms post-stimulus), added to the time
course of NE physiological effects (100–200ms post-discharge)
(Aston-Jones et al., 1980; Foote et al., 1983; Pineda, 1995; Berridge
and Waterhouse, 2003), is consistent with the typical P3 latency.
Phasic activity of the LC-NE system is sensitive to various
aspects of stimuli to which the P3 amplitude is also sensitive,
including motivational significance, probability of occurrence,
and attention allocation. Similarly to the P3, LC phasic activity
is generally more closely related to the arousing nature of a given
stimulus than to the affective valence of the stimulus (Berridge
and Waterhouse, 2003). For example, phasic LC responses occur
following both positive and negative outcomes, provided that
such outcomes require the animals to update their model of the
environment (Rasmussen et al., 1986).
Noting the similarities between the context updating hypoth-
esis and the involvement of the LC-NE system during learning,
Nieuwenhuis (2011) reinterpreted the LC-P3 hypothesis and the
context updating hypothesis as being complementary rather than
competing accounts of the P3; with the LC-P3 hypothesis pro-
viding a mechanistic explanation, grounded on neuroscientific
evidence, to the more abstract context updating hypothesis. In
this sense, an important contribution of the LC-P3 theory is to
connect studies of the P3 with new accounts about the role of
the NE-mediated attention during learning. For example, it has
been proposed that phasic NE is a generic signal indicating the
need to attend to the environment and learn from it (Bouret
and Sara, 2004), or that phasic NE encodes unexpected uncer-
tainty (i.e., surprise in supposedly non-volatile environments)
about the current state within a task, and serves to interrupt the
ongoing processing associated with the default task state (Yu and
Dayan, 2005; Dayan and Yu, 2006). By conceptually linking the
P3 with theories about the role of NE-mediated attention during
learning, the LC-P3 hypothesis provides an initial framework to
interpret the functional role of the P3 in tasks involving outcome
evaluation.
MODULATION OF THE P3 BY OUTCOMES AND CONTEXTS
Applied to outcome evaluation and learning, the LC-P3 hypoth-
esis predicts that outcomes associated with high levels of
arousal or task-relevance (e.g., indicating the need for behavioral
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adjustment) will be associated with a large P3. The specific
conditions associated with these factors, however, may change
depending on the goal and the context of the task at hand. For
example, losing when losses could be avoided should elicit a larger
P3 than losing when losses are unavoidable. This section evaluates
whether the LC-P3 hypothesis provides a plausible account of the
P3 in brain studies of outcome evaluation and feedback-guided
learning.
Outcome valence
Early ERP studies of outcome processing suggested that feedback
indicating a bad performance (i.e., negative feedback) elicited
larger P3s than positive feedback (Squires et al., 1973; Picton et al.,
1976). However, subsequent studies showed that, when equated
for probability of occurrence, positive and negative feedback
elicited equally large P3s (Campbell et al., 1979), and that large
P3s were elicited both by negative outcomes when participants
thought they made a correct response, and by positive feed-
back when participants thought they made an incorrect response
(Horst et al., 1980). These studies suggested that the effect of
valence might have artificially emerged from the well-known sen-
sitivity of the P3 to stimulus probability (see results with the
oddball paradigm on section “Historical Antecedents of the P3”).
Using monetary rewards, Yeung and Sanfey (2004) found that
the P3 was sensitive to rewardmagnitude but insensitive to reward
valence. This result seems to fit with the idea that a large P3 is
observed both to affectively negative and positive stimuli, pro-
vided that they are matched according to subjective ratings of
arousal (Johnston et al., 1986; Keil et al., 2002). The claim that
the P3 is insensitive to outcome valence has been supported by
some studies (Sato et al., 2005; Yeung et al., 2005; Gu et al.,
2011b), but there has been more evidence implicating that out-
come valence does in fact modulate the P3. Some studies have
reported that losses elicit larger P3s than gains (Frank et al.,
2005; Cohen et al., 2007; Hewig et al., 2007), but surprisingly
most of the studies have reported the opposite pattern, with
larger P3s for gains than for losses (Toyomaki and Murohashi,
2005; Hajcak et al., 2007; Bellebaum and Daum, 2008; Wu and
Zhou, 2009; Bellebaum et al., 2010; Polezzi et al., 2010; Zhou
et al., 2010; Gu et al., 2011a; Kreussel et al., 2012). Importantly,
in all of the studies reporting larger P3s after losses than after
gains, participants could actually learn to avoid losses, so that
the probability of losing decreased with practice. It is, there-
fore, possible that the effect of valence was artificially derived
from the P3 sensitivity to stimulus probability. However, two
studies reporting larger P3s for gains than for losses share the
same characteristic (Bellebaum and Daum, 2008; Bellebaum
et al., 2010). Moreover, Bellebaum and Daum (2008) found
larger P3s for gains than for losses even when gains were more
likely than losses. New studies might try to determine under
what conditions the P3 is insensitive to outcome valence, and
under what conditions it is increased for gains or increased for
losses.
Recent studies have reported effects of the interaction between
outcome valence and other factors. Wu and Zhou (2009) found
that the difference between the P3 elicited by gains and losses
(larger P3s for gains in this case) was eliminated when the amount
of reward was inconsistent with the expectation built upon a
preceding cue. Following the idea that the P3 might reflect the
amount of cognitive resources allocated for stimulus processing
(Donchin and Coles, 1988), the authors suggested that the incon-
sistency between the actual and the expected outcome magnitude
might capture a large amount of attentional resources, such that
the attention allocated to process outcome valence is reduced. A
goal for new studies might be to replicate this effect and to spec-
ify under what circumstances the brain might need to distribute
attentional resources between outcome variables.
In another study, Zhou et al. (2010) reported the same main
effect of outcome valence, but in this case the difference was
enlarged by action choice as compared to inaction. The authors
suggest that action might increase the affective significance of
gains. However, it is not clear why this would not also be true
for losses.
In summary, the current evidence seems to disconfirm
the hypothesis that the P3 is insensitive to outcome valence.
Nevertheless, it is not clear whether the P3 is larger for gains or
larger for losses. New studies are needed in order to clarify this
issue. Also, and as already commented, early studies (Campbell
et al., 1979; Horst et al., 1980) suggested that the effect of valence
might result from the effect of another, more primitive, variable
such as stimulus probability or affective involvement during the
tasks. Contemporaneous studies need to take this possibility into
consideration, during the experimental design, data analysis, and
when forming conclusions.
Outcome magnitude
The independent coding model (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004) claims
that the P3 is insensitive to valence and sensitive to outcomemag-
nitude. Although the evidence reviewed in the previous section
poses doubts on the first claim, the second claim is widely sup-
ported by the literature. Most of the studies that have tested the
main effect of outcome magnitude have found more positive P3
responses to large magnitude outcomes than to small magnitude
outcomes (Toyomaki andMurohashi, 2005; Goyer et al., 2008;Wu
and Zhou, 2009; Bellebaum et al., 2010; Polezzi et al., 2010; Gu
et al., 2011a; Kreussel et al., 2012). In order to interpret this effect,
these studies have typically appealed to the concept of “motiva-
tional significance,” or the relevance of a stimulus for the current
task (Duncan-Johnson and Donchin, 1977).
Motivationally significant or relevant stimuli are presumed
to capture a large amount of attentional resources, and the P3
amplitude is supposed to scale with those attentional resources
(Donchin and Coles, 1988; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005a). Under
this interpretation, large magnitude outcomesmight receive more
attention and have a greater impact on memory than small mag-
nitude outcomes because they are more relevant for the final
outcome of the session (cf. Adcock et al., 2006). Indeed, in the
context of monetarily rewarded tasks, large magnitude outcomes
have a greater impact in cumulative earnings, for better or for
worse, depending on the outcome valence.
Recent studies have reported other effects involving outcome
magnitude. Bellebaum et al. (2010) reported that not only the
magnitude of the actual reward, but also the potential reward
magnitude, modulated the P3. They used a task in which, on
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each trial, subjects had to guess the location of a coin that
was hidden in one of six boxes. At the beginning of each trial,
subjects were informed about the amount of money that they
could win (i.e., 5¢, 20¢, or 50¢). Interestingly, the P3 elicited by
non-rewarding outcomes (i.e., 0¢) scaled with the magnitude of
the informed potential reward. In another study, Wu and Zhou
(2009) found that the effect of outcome magnitude (i.e., larger
P3s for large rewards than for small rewards) was eliminated
when the reward amount was inconsistent with the expectation
built upon a preceding cue. As already mentioned in the previ-
ous section, Wu and Zhou suggested that all attentional resources
might be allocated by such inconsistency with expectations,
leaving no resources available to process other outcome-related
variables.
In summary, the P3 is consistently modulated by outcome
magnitude, being more positive for large magnitude outcomes
than for small magnitude outcomes. This effect may reflect that
the motivational significance of outcomes scales with outcome
magnitude. According to this interpretation both the actual and
the expected magnitude of rewards determine the motivational
significance of the outcome.
Outcome probability
Studies employing the classic oddball paradigm and manipulat-
ing the probability of the appearance of a particular stimulus
showed that the P3 is more positive for infrequent stimuli than
for frequent stimuli (Courchesne et al., 1977; Duncan-Johnson
and Donchin, 1977; Johnson and Donchin, 1980). In the con-
text of learning tasks, an early study reported that the largest P3s
were elicited by negative feedback when participants thought they
made a correct response, and by positive feedback when partic-
ipants thought they made an incorrect response (Horst et al.,
1980). Given this evidence, it has long been recognized that the P3
is modulated by stimulus probability, with more positive ampli-
tudes elicited by unlikely our unexpected stimuli than to likely or
expected stimuli.
Studies using monetary rewards and manipulating reward
probability have widely supported the conclusion that the P3
is larger for unexpected outcomes than for expected outcomes,
regardless of valence (Hajcak et al., 2005, 2007; Bellebaum and
Daum, 2008; Wu and Zhou, 2009; Xu et al., 2011). These results
are consistent with the context updating hypothesis stating that
unexpected outcomes signal the need to update a mental model
and that the P3 reflects the amount of cognitive resources allo-
cated to this updating process. The results are also consistent
with the LC-P3 hypothesis stating that the P3 reflects the impact
of phasic NE in the neocortex. Indeed, it has been noted that
increasing stimuli probability reduces the magnitude of phasic
LC responses (Alexinsky et al., 1990; Aston-Jones et al., 1994),
and phasic LC responses have been proposed to code unexpected
uncertainty or surprise (Yu and Dayan, 2005; Dayan and Yu,
2006).
Two studies, however, have reported results that pose doubts
into the modulatory effect of probability over the P3. While
the P3s following wins were significantly affected by probabil-
ity in these two studies, with unlikely wins eliciting larger P3s
than likely wins, P3s for losses were either not modulated by
probability (Cohen et al., 2007) or modulated in the opposite
direction (Kreussel et al., 2012) (i.e., larger P3s for expected losses
than for unexpected losses). After observing that the probabil-
ity effect was maximal over anterior sites, Cohen et al. (2007),
suggested that their results were more related with the FRN
than with the P3. Indeed, and given that the FRN for unex-
pected losses tend to be larger (i.e., more negative) than the
FRN for expected losses, the overlap between the FRN and
the P3 may also explain the effect reported by Kreussel et al.
(2012). Disentangling different outcome-related ERP compo-
nents is one of the main challenges for ERP studies of outcome
processing.
In summary, a large amount of evidence, coming both from
classical studies using the oddball paradigm and from more
recent studies using learning and gambling tasks, support the
idea that the P3 is larger for unexpected events than for expected
events, regardless of the event valence. Some studies have reported
results contradicting this claim, but methodological considera-
tions related to the overlap between the P3 and the FRN appear
to provide a plausible explanation for such discrepancy.
Behavioral adjustment
Learning-guided decision-making tasks typically require stor-
ing and dynamically adjusting information about state-choice-
outcome contingencies. Convergent evidence suggests that the
LC-NE system contributes to learning this type of association.
For example, it has been noted that the injection of a drug that
increased the firing of LC neurons in rats promotes the ani-
mal’s adaptation to changes in the behavioral requirements of a
reinforcement-learning task (Devauges and Sara, 1990). In the
monkey, LC activation has been reported to be restricted to task-
relevant stimuli that require a behavioral shift (Aston-Jones et al.,
1999). Building on this evidence, Bouret and Sara (2005) pro-
posed that phasic NE could provoke or facilitate the dynamic
reorganization of the neural networks determining the behavioral
output. Similarly, Dayan and Yu (2006) proposed that NE sig-
nals encode unexpected surprise, serving to interrupt the ongoing
processing and concentrate attentional resources in behavioral
adjustment.
If, as the LC-P3 hypothesis proposes, the P3 reflects the
NE-mediated enhancement of signal transmission in the cor-
tex during the stimulus-induced revision of an internal model
of the environment, a large P3 at the time of outcome pro-
cessing should predict a large behavioral adjustment. In one
of the few studies that have explored the relationship between
the P3 and behavioral adjustment, Yeung and Sanfey (2004)
found that individual differences in the P3 elicited by alter-
native, unchosen outcomes were related to behavioral adjust-
ments. After dividing the participants into two groups on
the basis of the size of their behavioral adjustment after tri-
als in which they failed to select a card associated with a
large win, they found that the difference in the P3 ampli-
tude elicited by large-gain and large-loss alternative outcomes
was larger in the participants showing a greater behavioral
adjustment. In another study, Chase et al. (2011) found that
P3 amplitude was greater for negative outcomes that preceded
behavioral adjustment than for negative outcomes that did not
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precede behavioral adjustment in a probabilistic reversal-learning
paradigm.
Evidence that dissociates the P3 from behavioral adjustment
has also been reported. Specifically, Frank et al. (2005) found that,
across participants, the difference between the ability to learn
to avoid losses and the ability to learn to approach gains was
predicted by the difference in the FRN amplitude elicited by neg-
ative and positive feedback, but not by the P3. Interestingly, the
results found by Chase et al. (2011) showed the opposite pattern,
with the P3 but not the FRN predicting behavioral adjustment.
A possible reason for the discrepancy is that in Frank et al.’s
study the need for adjustment was always signaled by losses,
and as already reviewed the most consistent finding about the
FRN is that it is larger for losses than for gains. In contrast,
in the study by Chase and colleagues participants were explic-
itly instructed to switch choice behavior only when they were
sure that a rule determining the stimulus-outcome contingen-
cies had changed, and not after losing per se. Another possibility
for this discrepancy is that both the FRN and the P3 code
behavioral adjustment, but their relative involvement in this pro-
cess depends on the goal of the task at hand or on the level
of information processing that is required to adjust behavior.
Evidence is scant to strongly support any of these possibilities,
and future research is needed to determine the factors determin-
ing the relative involvement of the FRN and the P3 in behavioral
adjustment.
DISCUSSION
The studies reviewed here suggest that the brain mechanism
underlying the FRN and the P3 are consistently involved in out-
come processing, but at the same time the literature shows an
important degree of scientific uncertainty regarding the factors
that affect the amplitude of these ERP components. Although the
studies reviewed here have enough trials per condition (Marco-
Pallares et al., 2011) and sample sizes that allowed them to detect
significant results, reaching conclusions that generalize across
studies have proven to be difficult. The FRN tends to increase
its amplitude in response to negative outcomes and the P3 tends
to increase its amplitude in response to arousing or task-relevant
outcomes, but there are important exceptions in the literature that
weaken the generalization of these statements.
In order to advance a model that integrates FRN and P3
effects in a unitary and real-time account of outcome processing,
ERP studies of outcome processing will have to address method-
ological, empirical, and conceptual challenges in the upcoming
years. First, optimizing paradigm design will be critical for being
able to generalize conclusions about the role of the FRN and
the P3 during outcome processing. Second, in order to allow
a reliable comparison between studies, the field will have to
advance toward standard methods to measure the ERP compo-
nents. Third, ERP studies have intrinsic limitations for identifying
brain regions and networks involved in outcome processing.
Complementary techniques should be increasingly used to over-
come such limitations. Fourth, studies interested in the effect of
outcome variables on the FRN and P3 have typically involved
different task demands (e.g., passive observation of outcome,
active decision-making, etc.). Determining the impact of task
demands on these ERP components will be crucial to be able
to generalize conclusions about their role. Finally, the stud-
ies reviewed here portray outcome processing as two relatively
disconnected processes. Our modern view of the brain, how-
ever, suggests that outcome processing probably involves several
subprocesses concurring and interacting in time. ERP stud-
ies should take advantage of their high temporal resolution to
study the temporal cascade of outcome processing in the brain.
These challenges are further discussed in the remainder of the
article.
METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGE: OPTIMIZING PARADIGM DESIGNS
During the last decade, ERP studies of outcome processing have
produced a wealth of evidence employing a rich variety of exper-
imental paradigms. While this heterogeneity is needed to gen-
eralize conclusions about the properties of a neural correlate
beyond a particular experimental task, there is a risk associated
with designing tasks that do not adequately isolate the variables
of interest. For example, as already commented, early P3 studies
concluded that negative feedback elicited larger P3s than positive
feedback, but subsequently Campbell et al. (1979) showed that
these results mostly reflected the well-known effect of stimulus
probability on the P3.
More contemporaneous studies, especially some of those using
feedback-guided learning, could be associated with a similar
confound. These groups found that losing was associated with
larger P3s than winning, but it is equally possible that this
result reflects a probability effect: as learning progresses, losing
becomes less likely. In order to dissociate a valence effect from
a learning/probability/expectancy effect, ERP studies of outcome
processing might benefit from measuring ERP components on
different stages of the experimental session, or by comparing the
ERP response from participants that demonstrate learning with
those who do not.
Another confound that can limit the validity of the results is
the potential gap between the goal that the participants really
pursue during an experimental session and the goal that the
experimenter is trying to elicit. For example, paradigms designed
for studying the modulatory effect of participants’ prediction
on brain activity elicited by gains and losses might unintention-
ally emphasize the goal of predicting the upcoming outcome. If
participants are asked about their belief on the incoming out-
come, they might even perceive a predicted loss as a positive
feedback (i.e., a correct prediction). To limit the effect of this
confound while still being able study the effect of participants’
predictions, paradigms should emphasize the goal of ensuring
gains and avoiding losses. For example, experimenters couldmake
outcomes contingent on participants’ behavior and not purely
probabilistic. Also, researchers could benefit from verbal reports
about the task and its goals during pilot studies.
The study of outcome processing is associated with a large
number of variables (i.e., outcome valence, outcome magnitude,
expectancy toward magnitude, probability of winning, learning,
motivation, etc.) that, depending on the task at hand, might
covary in a way that undermines empirical results. Paradigms
should be designed acknowledging this complexity in a way that
minimizes the chances of introducing confounds.
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METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGE: ADVANCING TOWARD STANDARD
MEASUREMENT METHODS
An inherent difficulty of the ERP technique is that, because of
potential component overlap, the comparison of ERPs elicited
by different experimental conditions is often difficult to inter-
pret (Luck, 2005). Although this problem is inherently technical,
the manner by which it is addressed in each study may deter-
mine empirical results and functional interpretations. Research
focused on the FRN has traditionally tried to solve this issue by
creating difference waves (e.g., loss minus win) (Miltner et al.,
1997; Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002; Mars
et al., 2004; Hajcak et al., 2005, 2007; Potts et al., 2006; Holroyd
et al., 2009, 2011; Walsh and Anderson, 2011; Xu et al., 2011).
The problem with this approach is that it does not resolve the
question whether the FRN corresponds to a negative deflection
in one condition or to a positive deflection in the other condi-
tion. More recent studies have highlighted the importance of this
issue by showing that, when gains and losses are measured sepa-
rately, even the definition of the FRN as negative deflection that
distinguishes negative from positive outcomes can be questioned
(Oliveira et al., 2007).
Two alternative methods to measure ERP components have
been systematically employed in ERP studies of outcome process-
ing. The first approach is to compute the mean amplitude in a
time window defined for each ERP component (e.g., 200–300ms
for the FRN) post-onset of the outcome and to enter that mean
amplitudes into statistical analyses (Gehring and Willoughby,
2002; Ruchsow et al., 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004b; Yeung et al.,
2005; Cohen et al., 2007; Cohen and Ranganath, 2007; Hewig
et al., 2007; Bellebaum andDaum, 2008; Goyer et al., 2008; Polezzi
et al., 2010; San Martin et al., 2010; Zhou et al., 2010; Gu et al.,
2011b; Kreussel et al., 2012; Luque et al., 2012). This method
has the strength of increasing the signal-to-noise ratio in addi-
tion to allowing for better trial-by-trial measures. Nevertheless, it
assumes equivalent baseline for each ERP component in different
conditions. Given the overlap between P3 and FRN, this issue is
particularly critical in outcome processing research. Indeed, the
net amplitude of the FRN can be shifted to more positive values
if the FRN for a particular condition is superimposed in a P3 that
is particularly large. The second alternative method is to measure
the base-to-peak difference for each deflection (e.g., defining the
FRN as the difference between the most positive point and the
most negative point in the 150–350ms time window post-onset of
feedback) (Holroyd et al., 2004a; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Frank
et al., 2005; Toyomaki and Murohashi, 2005; Hajcak et al., 2006;
Oliveira et al., 2007; Bellebaum et al., 2010; Chase et al., 2011).
One problem with this measure is that it is especially susceptible
to noise. Noise can be controlled by replacing the base of compar-
ison with the mean amplitude in a time window around the base
and by replacing the peak measure with the mean amplitude in a
time window around the peak. A more fundamental problem is
that the measure of the base (e.g., the beginning of the FRN) may
be affected by the adjacent deflection (e.g., P2-like positivity).
Alternative methods that have been explored in recent years
include isolating the activity associated with a particular ERP
component using bandpass filtering (e.g., measuring the FRN
after removing the slower frequency to which the P3 is associated)
(Luu et al., 2003; Wu and Zhou, 2009; Gu et al., 2011a; Yu
et al., 2011) or using temporospatial principal component anal-
ysis (PCA) (Carlson et al., 2011; Foti et al., 2011) or independent
component analysis (ICA) (Gentsch et al., 2009). One limitation
of these methods is that they strongly rely on decisions made
by the researchers regarding the parameters used for bandpass
filtering or during the identification of the PCA-derived or ICA-
derived components that will be considered to represent the ERP
components of interest. However, the emerging use of data-driven
approaches for the selection of independent components (Wessel
and Ullsperger, 2011) suggests that ICAmight become a standard
technique to decompose ERP components in the incoming years.
The problem of component overlap is inherent to all ERP
research. In recent years, researches interested in how the brain
processes outcomes have begun to consider ways to dissociate the
contribution of the FRN and the P3 to the scalp-recorded ERP
signal, and different methods have been proposed to achieve this
goal. Given that the choice made among different measurement
methods can have consequences, both in the empirical results
that are found and in the conclusions that are proposed, future
research should explore the strengths and limitations of different
measurement methods and advance toward standard practices.
METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGE: EMPLOYING MULTI-METHODS
APPROACHES (ERP/TIME-FREQUENCY, ERP/fMRI)
The temporal resolution of the EEG signal allows studying the
neurocognitive mechanism of outcome processing and learning
with a high level of temporal detail (milliseconds). The extrac-
tion of outcome-locked ERPs from the EEG signal is a good
way to identify and study regularities in the neural processing of
outcomes. However, ERP research presents two important limita-
tions: it is relatively insensitive to the involvement of large-scale
brain networks and it has a limited ability to identify the neural
generators of the scalp-recorded signals (i.e., poor spatial resolu-
tion). Complementary techniques can be used to overcome such
limitations. Specifically, time-frequency-based approaches could
complement ERP studies by shedding light on the interactions
among large-scale networks and fMRI can be used in a comple-
mentary fashion to help resolve the so-called inverse problem: a
given distribution of scalp-recorded electrical activity could have
been generated by any one of a large number of different sets of
neural generators.
In order to provide a better account of the neural dynamics
of outcome processing, EEG/ERP studies can benefit from the
time-frequency information that is present in the same EEG sig-
nal from which ERPs are extracted. Event-related oscillations can
be extracted using time-frequency decomposition analyses such
as complex wavelet convolutions, from which one can obtain esti-
mates of phase synchronization, spectral coherence, power-power
correlations, spectral Granger causality, and cross-frequency cou-
pling among recording sites (for a review see Cohen et al.,
2011). Assessing large-scale networks is especially important to
better understand the dynamics of feedback-guided learning,
given that learning probably corresponds to changes in con-
nectivity between neural populations (Hebb, 1949). Specifically,
time-frequency-based approaches could be used to test hypothe-
ses about inter-regional coupling between areas that probably
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interact during feedback-guided learning, such as medial pre-
frontal, sensory, and motor cortices.
A fundamental problem of EEG/ERP research is the inverse
problem, by which a given distribution of scalp-recorded elec-
trical activity could have been generated by any one of a large
number of different sets of neural generators. Despite this prob-
lem, convergent evidence suggests that it is highly probable that
the neural sources of the FRN are located in the mPFC (Miltner
et al., 1997; Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Ruchsow et al., 2002;
Holroyd et al., 2004b; van Schie et al., 2004; Muller et al., 2005;
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005b; Hewig et al., 2007; Yu and Zhou, 2009;
Yu et al., 2011). The picture ismuch less clear for the P3, for which
neural sources are probably distributed over different regions of
the cortex. In the same way that theories of the FRN have ben-
efited from theories about the functional role of the mPFC (and
vice versa), our understanding of the functional role of the P3 and
its subcomponents during outcome processing could benefit from
a more precise identification of its neural sources.
Increasingly, efforts are being made in order to use fMRI
data to constrain the solution of the algorithms used for source
localization analyses for ERPs. Although this approach does not
completely solve the inverse problem, it increases the likelihood of
identifying the actual sources of ERP activity. Especially promis-
ing is the use of joint ERP and fMRI ICA that have been used to
reveal a number of cortical and subcortical areas involved in the
generation of the response-locked ERN (Edwards et al., 2012).
EMPIRICAL CHALLENGE: DETERMINING THE IMPACT OF TASK
DEMANDS
One of the primary goals of the brain is the adaptive control of
behavior, but the exact definition of what constitutes an adap-
tive behavior may vary across situations, and different brain
mechanisms can be recruited to guide behavior depending on
the demands imposed by the task at hand. ERP studies of out-
come processing have employed experimental paradigms whose
behavioral demands range from the passive observation of mon-
etary gains and losses in a computer screen (e.g., Yeung et al.,
2005; Potts et al., 2006) to feedback-guided decision-making tasks
requiring the inference of probabilistic rules governing state-
outcome contingencies (e.g., Bellebaum and Daum, 2008; Chase
et al., 2011; Walsh and Anderson, 2011). This breadth is a rich
source of evidence, but at the same time is a likely factor under-
lying the difficulty for extracting generalizable conclusions about
how outcome properties affect each ERP component.
The question of what ERP component better predicts behav-
ioral adjustment is a good example of how different tasks may
recruit different mechanisms to achieve the same overall goal
(e.g., to accumulate monetary rewards). Behavioral adjustment
might depend on the system underlying the FRN in tasks de-
incentivizing the adoption of an explicit rule (cf. Cohen and
Ranganath, 2007), and on the system underlying the P3 in tasks
incentivizing the use of explicit probabilistic beliefs (cf. Chase
et al., 2011). This possible dissociation has an interesting par-
allel with a distinction proposed by Daw et al. (2005) between
model-free reinforcement learning (mediated by the basal ganglia
in a way that is consistent with the RL-theory of the FRN) and
model-based reinforcement learning (mediated by brain regions
that have shown P3-like activity, such as the DLPFC, and MTL
structures).
Future studies might elucidate whether different ERP com-
ponents reflect the recruitment of different learning systems
depending upon different tasks demands. In general, it is fore-
seeable that future ERP studies will, in greater proportion, be
concerned with how different task demands and task contexts
modulate the effect that outcomes have on ERP components.
CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGE: UNDERSTANDING THE TEMPORAL
CASCADE OF OUTCOME PROCESSING IN THE BRAIN
ERP studies of outcome processing have been focused primar-
ily on the FRN and secondarily on the P3. There have been few
attempts to present an account of outcome processing in the brain
that integrates FRN and P3 effects. In this regard, the independent
coding model (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004) is the dominant proposal
to date. By proposing that the FRN codes valence but is insensi-
tive to magnitude and that the P3 shows the opposite pattern, this
model presents these two ERP components as measures reflect-
ing brain processes that are completely independent from each
other. Moreover, the temporal succession between the frontally
distributed FRN and the parietally distributed P3 is not taken into
account; for this model it does not matter if valence is evaluated
before magnitude or if magnitude is evaluated before valence.
Actually, the temporal cascade of ERP components is generally
disregarded even in studies finding evidence that contradicts the
independent coding model.
ERP effects are not always the real-time reflections of the
underlying processes. For example, according to the LC-P3
hypothesis the P3 is an indirect index of LC phasic responses
occurring 300–400ms before the peak of the P3. However, the
ubiquitous temporospatial succession between the frontally dis-
tributed FRN and the parietally distributed P3 probably reveals
something meaningful about the manner in which the brain pro-
cesses and learns from outcomes. Much of the contribution of
ERP research to cognitive neuroscience has to do with describ-
ing the temporal cascade of neurocognitive processes involved
in solving a particular task. ERP studies of outcome process-
ing, in this regard, have traditionally sub-exploited the temporal
resolution of the ERP technique.
There is also evidence suggesting that the FRN and the parietal
P3 are not the only ERP deflections reflecting outcome pro-
cessing in the brain. Studies could benefit from measuring the
frontally distributed P3a that peaks 60–80ms earlier than the P3b
(Courchesne et al., 1975; Squires et al., 1975; Friedman et al.,
2001), which according to a visual inspection is present in most
of the ERP studies of outcome processing. These studies might
also benefit from quantifying a positive deflection that typically
began 150ms after stimulus onset in frontal sites, and that accord-
ing to Goyer et al. (2008) is modulated by outcome magnitude.
This positivity, which in terms of latency could be referred to as
“P2,” (see Figure 1A) probably represents an early stage of the
slow-wave P3a on which the FRN is superimposed.
By considering the whole sequence of ERP deflections that
are modulated by outcomes, ERP studies might contribute to
build models of outcome processing that incorporate the inter-
relationship between different cognitive processes that probably
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take part in outcome processing and learning, such as attention,
valuation, and memory.
OUTLOOK
In order to control the behavior in an adaptive manner the brain
has to learn how certain situations predict positive or negative
outcomes and what actions are appropriate in a given situation.
ERP research has shown that the brain is able to evaluate and learn
from outcomes within a few hundred milliseconds of their occur-
rence. However, the accumulated literature presents a high degree
of scientific uncertainty regarding the factors that modulate dif-
ferent ERP components during outcome processing. The FRN,
in most cases, is larger for negative than for positive outcomes,
but the effect of outcome magnitude and outcome probability
over the FRN is less clear and contradicting evidence has been
found regarding the relationship between the FRN and behav-
ioral adjustment. The P3 is consistently more positive for large
magnitude and unexpected outcomes than for small magnitude
and expected outcomes, respectively, but the modulatory effect of
feedback valence and the relationship between P3 and behavioral
adjustment is much less clear.
During the last decade, ERP research has accumulated rich evi-
dence of how outcomes are processed in the human brain. The
next decade of research will probably be characterized by growing
efforts to reach conclusions that generalize across task scenarios
demands. In doing so, this research will advance our understand-
ing of how the brain is able produce adaptive behavior in a large
variety of situations.
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